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The buzz of Brexit and Trump brought with it a new Oxford English Dictionary word of the 
year: ‘post-truth’. Defined as ‘denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’ (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2018), the notion of post-truth has ridden the wave of anti-expert 
discourse in Europe and the USA. As expected, the academic community, the metropolitan 
intelligentsia, those holding onto technocratic ideas of politics—and yes, some critical 
management scholars too, were up in arms against alternative facts within their own social 
media and journalistic bubbles. In this paper, we take the opportunity to raise a note of 
caution to our critical kin and provocatively ask: Is not the goal of critical management 
studies (CMS) to contest the idea that we live in a world of hard facts? If this is the case, our 
motivation for ‘speaking out’ stems from our concerns as to how to respond to a manager, 
student, Brexit-backer, or Trump-supporter if they confront us as CMS academics with what 
is their own peek behind the power dynamics of science, economics and management. 
To better position CMS within the debates on post-truth and politics, we first present 
some fairly successful attempts to contest ‘truth’ and create communities that promulgate 
alternative ideas. After this, we tentatively sketch out three ways CMS scholars have made 
certain truth claims and consider their viability when truth is problematized. Finally, we make 
the case for a form of agonistic critique that places a stronger emphasis on new forms of 
affect and the role this has in regard to truth(s). 
Presenting Alternative Facts: Climate Change Deniers, Flat Earthers, 
and Critters 
During the 1960s, the tobacco industry was in crisis as emerging medical literature started to 
prove a direct relationship between smoking and cancer (Harford, 2017; Oreskes and 
Conway, 2010). Public relations firms, employed by tobacco corporations, focused on sowing 
seeds of doubt rather than challenging medical claims head on. Keeping controversy alive 
was one of their main achievements. There was ‘no medical evidence’, the debate was 
‘unresolved’ as nothing had been ‘statistically proven’ or ‘scientifically established’ and 
science was never ‘finished’, anyway. Their language was clinical and their attitude cynical, 
which led such companies into direct conflict with the scientific community. Today, 
Monsanto is reportedly using very similar tactics (Rose et al., 2018).  
In a comparable, albeit magnified fashion, climate change denial follows a similar 
logic. However, unlike tobacco firms, the climate change ‘denial machine’ has more weapons 
in its arsenal. Alongside PR companies, various think tanks1 are funded by conservative 
                                                          
1 The American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute, Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, Heartland Institute 
amongst others (see Dunlap and McCright, 2011: 147). 
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foundations and fossil fuel companies (Wittneben et al., 2012). In addition to these is an 
active echo chamber of amateur climate change bloggers, diverse conservative media outlets, 
politicians and contrarian scientists who are all keen to discredit and debunk the ‘climate 
change myth’. For instance, during ‘Climategate’ (Fang, 2009) emails from the University of 
East Anglia were hacked and heralded as proof (e.g. Delingpole, 2009) that climate change is 
a scientific conspiracy. Following swiftly afterwards, errors were then spotted in the 2007 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Tollefson, 2010), further fanning the flames. As explored 
by Dunlap and McCright (2011: 144), motivations for climate change denial can stem from 
economic reasons (e.g. the fossil fuel industry) and personal gain (the minor celebrity status 
enjoyed by some prominent deniers). Still, what unites most deniers, is a political opposition 
to ‘governmental regulatory efforts to ameliorate climate change’ (ibid., see also Oreskes and 
Conway, 2010). In other words, climate change deniers are held together by financial 
incentives, issues of individual esteem and a normative intent to challenge the status quo in 
favour of less governmental involvement in markets.  
In recent years, another scientific community has emerged that takes on mainstream 
science in various ways. The Flat Earth Society, ‘a place for free thinkers and the intellectual 
exchange of ideas’ (TFES, n.d.-a), aims to prove that the earth is in fact a disc framed by the 
cold rim of Antarctica accelerating upwards through space. Their ideas have become 
increasingly topical (e.g. Goenka, 2016) and on their website,2 you will find multiple 
scientific articles and a wiki dealing with topics like celestial gravitation and electromagnetic 
acceleration. However, in addition to this, they are also backed by the rapper B.O.B and ex-
basketball star Dr Shaquille O’Neal. Such endorsements are slightly tongue-in-cheek, but not 
to be sniffed at, especially when you consider the role Gwyneth Paltrow and Robert De Niro 
played in convincing thousands of wealthy, educated and insured US Americans to not 
vaccinate their children (Seither et al., 2014; Suddaby et al., 2017). When pushed to breaking 
point, the Flat Earth Society’s last resort is ‘the conspiracy’, a blanket term used to describe 
NASA and the various other ‘“space agencies” and those who are informed by them 
(including government)’ (TFES, n.d.-b). The climate change denier community regularly 
utilizes similar rhetoric pointing not only to overzealous hippies getting carried away, but 
also to regulatory bodies within government (Dunlap and McCright, 2011). However, Flat 
Earthers differ from their climate change denying cousins and tobacco industry grandparents 
as they use a mix of humour and scientific logic to refute mainstream science, develop 
alternative theory, and problematize a variety of different phenomena (from tides to 
chemtrails). All these activities are tied together under a broad tent of being suspicious of 
corporations, the establishment, and mainstream science, who they believe dupe the 
population. 
Common to all these tactics of questioning scientific truth is that they add complexity 
and refocus attention. For the PR companies of the 1960s and more worryingly the climate 
change deniers of the 2000s, science is shown to be a process that never reaches a final 
answer; it is fundamentally human and therefore flawed. On the other hand, climate change 
deniers and the Flat Earth Society use their own version of science to contest the facts. 
However, it is a sufficiently non-mainstream form of a science that deploys rather different 
starting assumptions. The Flat Earth Society also enlists a variety of aesthetic methods to 
increase the possibility for certain ideas to ‘go viral’. In all cases, when all else fails, the 
message is to question everything, contest the establishment, and continually suggest that 
individuals have been tricked by some powerful other. Such questioning includes but goes 
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beyond what might be considered the normal scientific doubt of a Cartesian (Descartes, 1999) 
or Popperian (1959) kind. ‘Doubt’ here invokes personal scepticism to overrule what the 
majority of people and scientists consider ‘objective facts’ as it actively foregrounds the 
affective element of ‘truth effects’. The objectivity of ‘truth’ has always had its own affective 
appeal too, but this was to be repressed in the name of science.  
Our contention is that the strategies of questioning we have described thus far are 
almost identical to the ones employed by many, although not all, CMS academics over the 
past 25 years. Whether or not CMS academics are motivated by debunking science, like a flat 
earther, or hoping to maintain individual status, prestige and to protect financial interests and 
future prosperity, like some climate change sceptics, is up for debate (cf. Billig, 2013; Wray-
Bliss, 2003, 2004). What CMS undoubtedly shares with both climate change deniers and flat 
earthers is a normative intent and a political challenge to the status quo and mainstream 
academia. The CMS community has always been encouraged to deconstruct the ‘reality’ of 
organizational life and organizational knowledge and expose their status as truth-effects 
maintained by a particular ‘regime of truth’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Foucault, 1977). 
CMS scholars should reflexively examine matters of ontology and epistemology (Fournier 
and Grey, 2000), be wary of evidence-based management (Learmonth, 2008; Morrell and 
Learmonth, 2015) and refuse any ‘discursive closure’ (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). Long 
before Michael Gove declared that Britain had ‘had enough of experts’ (Mance, 2016), 
Barbara Townley was calling on critical scholars to fight against the ‘paradigm of the expert’ 
(1994: 26). The Flat Earth Society’s contention that science is a political process involving 
fallible human beings, paradigms and power dynamics, if accompanied by references to 
Foucault (1977, 1979, 2008) regarding regimes of truth, could be marked highly in a critical 
undergraduate assignment. It might even be published in a critical journal… Of course, and 
quite rightly, much of this critique sits atop a broader critical attitude towards capitalism and 
the establishment, which is regularly the last bastion in any argument for all of us in the CMS 
community. 
Yet, we do not think that such a comparison is just aimed at the radically social 
constructionist sects of CMS. On the ‘realist’ end of the CMS spectrum (see Scherer, 2009), 
Critical Realist approaches to truth and reality similarly acknowledge the distortion of 
language and perception that blocks direct access to truth and causality (Contu and Willmott, 
2005; Fairclough, 2005; Laclau and Bhaskar, 1998; Reed, 2005). Though Critical Realists 
assume the possibility of garnering a clearer picture of a single objective reality (a realist 
ontology) over time, the fundamental structures that define social reality are neither readily 
accessible, nor clear-cut (a constructivist epistemology). Similarly, CMS scholars working 
within a Habermasian tradition (e.g. Willmott, 2003) accept the socially constructed nature of 
the explanandum and the consensus driven nature of the subsequent explanans. Such a 
‘critical modernist’ would not ‘claim that truth is a grail that can be reached’ (Parker, 1995: 
554). For instance, taking a broadly Habermasian position, Marti and Scherer (2016) argue 
that the performative effects of social scientific descriptions of the world conserve our current 
social reality rather than act for social welfare. Therefore, if we wanted a different world, 
they argue, we should construct more normative theories of it. This is not a view of reality 
and truth as unique, rather, theories and truths are to be used to affect change in reality. 
We agree with Marti and Scherer (2016) that the CMS community should construct 
more normative theories. However, doing so, situates CMS far closer to the Flat Earth 
Society, with its scientific language, community of subjugated scholars, and normative 
theories, than to NASA. Again, this is not a problem; CMS has never been a place for 
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‘scientists’ and perhaps the current climate even presents an opportunity to shine. But for this 
to work, we have to acknowledge that denying our elitism, recently reinforced in the eyes of 
‘the people’ (Grey, 2018), would be ‘delusional’ (Stookey, 2008: 923). As Grey (2018) 
argues, CMS scholars have been denounced as part of the elite because they predominantly 
voted for Britain to remain in the EU and because they were considered ‘experts’. Grey 
(2018: 8) concludes that this means the end of CMS as we know it (at least in Britain) unless 
we imagine ‘new and creative ways to articulate CMS’. In the spirit of Stookey (2008), we 
would like to invite our readers to do just that. It is impossible to change how we (would 
have) voted but we might be able to surrender our status as ‘the experts’ by broadening our 
‘populist’ engagement with the non-elite. 
Now that we are on the same page… 
Arguably, critical research should always adopt a questioning and power-conscious attitude, 
but this is not a position on which to rebuke notions of fake news and anti-expert discourses. 
In many respects, CMS prophets provide a glimpse at post-truth’s antecedents and, at the 
very least, point to the issue that an abstract, ‘scientific’ truth may well be a dangerous thing 
to claim to have found as this would imply a lack of reflexivity. But if we simply encourage 
more reflexivity on how individuals interact with dominant social structures, we might easily 
end up with people cynical of science and all too keen to act in self-interested, confused or 
navel-gazing ways. We want to suggest that it is not our scientificity, endeavours to unmask 
deeper truths, or distrust of positivist methods that sets CMS apart from other presenters of 
‘alternative facts’—but our ethico-political stance (see Parker, 1995). Thus, to avoid falling 
back onto an empiricist/positivist understanding of knowledge and truth but still be able to 
create openness to dialogue, as we explain below, we need to first form affective 
engagements. As Parker argues, ‘Rather than attempting to prove either the validity of our 
empirical observations or the epistemological coherence of our arguments’, we should 
‘simply begin with ethics […] If you can persuade me that a particular description articulates 
an ethical problem, then it becomes important’ (1999: 41, 42; also see Seidman, 1992). 
Ethico-political stances assume particular importance within the emerging discussion 
of engagement and performativity within CMS (Cabantous et al., 2016; King and Learmonth, 
2014; Learmonth et al., 2016; Spicer et al., 2009, 2016; Spoelstra and Svensson, 2016; 
Wickert and Schaefer, 2015). Whether called ‘impact’ or being a public intellectual, in the 
next section, we discuss three ways in which CMS can engage within the realm of post-truth. 
We see the role of the CMS community as furnishing sympathetic actors-of-struggle with the 
instruments to analyse how truths are created, while remembering that such ethico-political 
and intellectual commitments are, and should be, provisional (Barratt, 2004, 2008). This is 
arguably a useful skill for critical scholars and activists but it makes caring for (our) truth an 
important, yet complex, practice.  
In the next section we introduce three critical forms of engagement: Socratic, Cynical 
and Agonistic. In doing so, we propose a more affective foundation to critique. We contend 
that affective links created through logic, reason, ethics and emotions do not make certain 
claims true but can make them very powerful (Laclau, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). 
Collins and Wray-Bliss (2005: 819) contemplate that critique is ‘self-legitimizing rather than 
self-evident’ and thus we have ‘to make explicit the (constructed) morality upon which our 
critique is based and to hope that the reader finds this more compelling than that constructed 
by [someone else]’. For example, think of the enlisting of beloved celebs by climate change 
deniers or Flat Earth advocates to reinforce certain truths and thus a certain morality. Or 
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consider the affective connections in the moral discourse of smoking, as we see health 
regulation, the political economy of productivity, and governance of individuals join together 
to condemn the ‘smoker’ as a totalized identity category (Brewis and Grey, 2008). Or think 
about how new affective subject positions (Dean, 2008) and collective affects (Anderson, 
2016; Stavrakakis, 2008; Zizek, 1989) are created during the neoliberal extension of markets 
to every sphere of life (Davies, 2014; Foucault, 2008), which would include climate change 
deniers’ challenge of government regulation. Affect appears to be a fundamental part of the 
success of these movements, and its importance is apparent in the realm of post-truth where 
neither can we speak about a singular truth, nor do so in a disengaged way.3 
E/Affective critique 
We believe that not all forms of critique are equally effective in a post-truth and largely 
populist environment. In this section, we will briefly discuss two widespread forms of critical 
practice in the CMS community that we call ‘Socratic’ and ‘Cynical’ critique. Then we will 
make the case for a more ‘Agonistic’ CMS (see Parker and Parker, 2017), which uses rhetoric 
to build affective relationships with constituents as a necessary precursor to engaging in 
discussions about any form of shared truth (Laclau, 2005). 
Socratic critique. Practiced by Socrates and the Stoics during debates in the agora, 
Socratic critique describes the frank everyday warnings of a philosopher to Athenians at risk 
of neglecting their own autonomy (Foucault, 2001). Translated into our domain, a Socratic 
CMS scholar, for example, would aim to convince the wider public that certain practices of 
the corporate and political elite foster forms of inequality. Busting elite balls should 
eventually lead to managers and directors engaging with the criticism and, hopefully, 
considerations for acting differently in the future due to public pressure. Such an approach 
often starts with a fact checking exercise to then build a case that could then be featured in 
popular media. For instance, the oeuvre of Prem Sikka in the field of public interest 
accounting largely falls into this category. His brilliant research on auditors’ malpractices 
shortly after the financial crisis, has been published as an academic journal article (Sikka, 
2009a), as opinion pieces (Sikka, 2008, 2009b, 2010) and has led to his engagement with 
policy makers. 
While immensely important on its own terms, if you are not a policy adviser or don’t 
follow the news, you are unlikely to encounter these messages. Subsequently, it will prove 
difficult to build a broad base of support and potent critique can be easily lost in the 
sensation-hungry media. Moreover, in terms of argumentative form, the Socratic critic 
claiming that ‘that’s simply not how things are’ strides very close to intellectual elitism. 
Educating our audience about why they should look behind seemingly objective realities is an 
important practice. However, issues of cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias and the catchy 
nature of untruth (Harford, 2017; Mercier and Sperber, 2017; Vosoughi et al., 2018) mean 
that using facts to tell someone they are wrong can only take you so far.  
Cynical critique operates through the closing down of dialogue. Unlike Socrates, the 
Kynics were more concerned with engaging with the masses, and being critical for them 
                                                          
3 As a reviewer has rightly pointed out, the positivist regime of truth is always already affective too. Indeed, this 
has been its appeal. Our concern in this paper, however, is with an audience for whom positivism resonates less 
affectively, who deride its scientificity, and often deem it part of the problem. Thus, far from implying a dualism 
between science and affect, we rather want to explore new kinds of affective relationships with some of our 
audiences. 
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consisted of ‘public, visible and scandalous exemplification of an independent life’ (Barratt, 
2008: 529; also Karfakis and Kokkinidis, 2011). The motivating idea here (quite literally in 
Diogenes’ case) is one of ‘pissing in public’. The aim is to reach notoriety and popularity in 
particular circles by differentiating ‘us’ and upsetting the powerful ‘them’. Subverting norms, 
ranting, storming out, protesting and being awkward are all tactics of the cynic. As Gibson 
Burrell has repeatedly stated, ‘dialogue is a weapon of the powerful’ (2001: 19). Burrell’s 
work exemplifies the aesthetic (Burrell, 1993) and theoretical (Bresnen and Burrell, 2012; 
Burrell, 1997) role the cynical transgression of mainstream methods of thought and 
presentation can play in organization theory. 
Critical scholars of organization and management using this approach are not 
supposed to bastardize their thought to achieve ‘impact’ outside of academia. Nor should they 
explain themselves to mainstream colleagues, journals, and university managers. The 
definition of impact would readily imply playing on the tilted turf of the more powerful. 
However, all too often (think Banksy or the ranting social media fodder of Jonathan Pie), 
anger and resistance are merely consumed. Such outbursts are deemed important, they gain 
traction, but are often quickly dismissed as an aesthetic attached to grumbling leftists’ 
complex modes of cynical distancing by mainstream commentators and even mainstream 
academics. 
Agonistic critique. Let us finally suggest a third form of critique that CMS scholars 
have not yet been so successful in utilizing. Agonistic critique (see Parker and Parker, 2017) 
builds on the belief that truth is always a contested social construct; subsequently, it is not 
enough to combat one set of ‘factual’ beliefs with more (or truer) ‘facts’. Lakoff (1987) 
argues that most human thinking, from everyday snap decisions to well-thought through 
ideas, are based on metonymy: ideal cases, representative paragons, unconscious typical 
examples and publicly debated stereotypes. We think one form of metonymy has become 
immensely important in our post-truth times: salient exemplars. These are ‘highly rare and 
very ugly individual examples that have been sensationalized by the media and [taken] as 
applying to the whole class’ (Lakoff, 2017). Reagan’s ‘welfare queen’, Trump’s rapist 
Mexican immigrants, the Leave campaign’s red bus with the message ‘We send the EU £350 
million a week, let’s fund our NHS instead’, are all such salient exemplars. These images are 
simple, and though they mostly constitute the exceptional or extreme case, they are easy to 
recall as if they were true for the whole group or issue. 
Of course, critical academics may choose Socratic critique but we argue that, in this 
new world of ‘feelings’ (Davies, 2018), to be more engaged and thus normative, new kinds of 
affective relationships must be crafted beyond those of evidence and facts. We therefore 
propose that we have to work on our own ‘populist frontier’ (Mouffe and Shahid, 2016) to 
communicate salient exemplars that might orbit some notion of truth and its underlying 
ethico-politics. This will come across as rather strange in the first instance because it may feel 
like both selling out and a meek oversimplification of academic work and theory. However, 
we need to recognize that what has become saliently imperative in a post-truth world is to 
convince the heart as much as the mind—to reprise: if you make me interested, I will listen 
(Parker, 1999). Thus, might it be possible to condense some of our arguments to form new 
affective relationships? Such relationships could be cultivated with workers (Roethlisberger 
and Dickson, 1939) as well as activist groups, communities and the broader public. Recall the 
mobilizing power of the Occupy slogan attributed to David Graeber, ‘We are the 99%’ 
(Sharlet, 2011). Behind the slogan was a great deal of academic thought—but does that 
matter to the broader public? 
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And what might be on the side of the CMS Brexit-inspired ‘red bus’? Salient 
exemplars need not always be ugly as Lakoff (2017) notes. Perhaps something about 
redistributing a large percentage of capital from the 1% through inheritance taxes could 
resonate, if articulated in a snappy way. For our students, a message about youth 
unemployment rates or the real value of their future salaries might be compelling. 
Alternatively, we could try, especially if we believe to have the biggest impact on society in 
our classrooms, to imagine futures based on certain values (Harney and Oswick, 2006) or 
surrounding certain organizational forms (Parker et al., 2014). This might involve discussing 
case studies of alternative organizations (Reedy and Learmonth, 2009), developing a shared 
vocabulary for imagining alternate futures (Fournier, 2006), or sending students out into 
socially aware organizations to learn from first-hand experience (Parker et al., 2018). 
Importantly, such efforts need to engage individuals affectively, not simply look good on 
paper. 
Affect inscribes the operation of the political (Kenny et al., 2011; Stavrakakis, 2008; 
Zizek, 1989). Subsequently, it is important to outline political positions in a particular form, 
but it is also integral that such positions have an affective force (Laclau, 2005). Affect can 
derive from beatific fantasies or horrific nightmare scenarios (Cederström and Spicer, 2014; 
Stavrakakis, 2010) that are held together by a powerful concept or exemplar but are 
nonetheless evocative and passionate. CMS already specializes in horrific nightmare 
scenarios, so in addition to terrible corporate practices, we should find instances of hope, 
subversion of dominant norms via blending and contortion, where change has actually 
happened (e.g. Contu, 2018; Parker and Parker, 2017). It is only by the prior establishment of 
an affective connection to a plurality of different truths that we would become able to discuss 
the details and engage in some sort of reasoned debate. 
Concluding thoughts 
Once we forgo the idea of a single truth, it does not make sense anymore to say that CMS 
should speak the truth to power. Fact-checking Socratic critique invests heavily into rational 
dialogue; however, this can easily be discredited as being politically motivated and biased—
exemplified by the infamous Trumpism: ‘fake news’. Affective communities and 
relationships are derived from those who already agree or who have already been harmed. 
You can present all the facts in the world (on auditing scandals, governmental misdeeds, 
climate change), but it won’t matter because of individual’s always present cognitive bias and 
eventual cognitive dissonance (Campbell et al., 1980). On the other hand, cynical critique 
with its principle of no dialogue, disdains the rationality of Socratic critique, or at least leaves 
it uncommunicated through intentional refusal or isolation. Unlike Socratic critique, it 
abounds in affect, alluding to ‘their’ descriptively dire ethical standing contrasted with ‘our’ 
honoured normative ethical standards, and helps bed in with those who already agree. The 
problem when trying to engage with a neutral or negative audience is the form of persuasion 
used rests on an already sympathetic ear. Although cynical critique may discuss an issue that 
is familiar to a general audience, the starting point is often too far removed for many to 
follow or care about. Subsequently, it often gets dismissed as ‘a rant’, pointless or simply 
funny.  
Although we may not share the same views as a flat earther or climate change denier, 
we can learn from the ways in which they seek to weaken mainstream ideas, foster new 
affective communities, and construct salient exemplars of their own. Through such agonistic 
critique, we could connect with good, if temporary, causes. Doing so follows on from the 
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new wave of critical approaches that aim to take an affirmative position to organizations 
(Parker et al., 2007; Parker and Parker, 2017) and even ‘progressive forms of management’ 
under the guise of critical performativity (Spicer et al., 2016). Taking an affirmative position 
requires a conscious attempt at building affective alliances with ongoing projects and new 
ideas through engaging ethico-political values and affect whilst seeking to change sedimented 
ideas and forms of logic. However, this break with the antagonistic criticality of the past also 
means that we have to be careful walking the tightrope between criticality and hypocrisy. We 
do believe it is still possible to create and champion knowledge that does not fuel the 
performative intent machines of business (Fournier and Grey, 2000). However, we must be 
wary of maintaining our critical edge but, at the same time, must also know when to soften 
this approach and move away from the elitist claims of an expert (Grey, 2018) who knows all 
the answers. By creating affective communities, a discussion of truth and ethics can take 
place which will allow the possibilities for collaboration on alternative futures, based around 
alternative truths. CMS has always been sceptical of truth claims, maybe in the current 
climate, it is time to take this position seriously. To do so, it must shed some of the 
intellectual elitism in favour of crafting affective relationships and salient exemplars for ‘the 
people’. 
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